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Conference Conclusions ".... and Beyond": Judicial
Review in the European Union
Kirk W. Junker*
The most-often cited American literary critic, Kenneth Burke -
who happens to have been born and raised in Pittsburgh, and
whose magnum opus, A Grammar of Motives, happens to have
begun as a study in constitutions, once referred to life as partici-
pation in an "unending conversation." Burke wrote:
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you
arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged
in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to
pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the dis-
cussion had already begun long before any of them got there,
so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the
steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you
decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then
you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; an-
other comes to your defense; another aligns himself against
you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your op-
ponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance.
However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows
late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion
still vigorously in progress. 1
We bring this conference, "Judicial Review in the Americas ...
and Beyond" to a close, but we do so not to end the discussion, but
only because we must depart from the parlor, so to speak, because
the hour has grown late, with the discussion still vigorously in
progress. To my reading, there have been three components to the
topic of our conference: "judicial review," "beyond" and "the Ameri-
cas." I will address some fundamental elements of each of these
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Duquesne Uni-
versity School of Law, 600 Locust Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15282, U.S.A., telephone +1 412
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components during my remarks on judicial review in the Euro-
pean Union.
"BEYOND"
First, why the notion of "beyond?" I insist to my students of
comparative law that when they address any substantive issues of
comparison, they must begin their study with a justification.
"Why compare?" I ask them. Comparison is not simply a juxtapo-
sition of otherwise unlike things, laid out beside each other as
though the connections - if any - are obvious. It is we who
make those connections, either explicitly or implicitly. The well-
known and often-cited German comparativists, Konrad Zweigert
and Hein Kotz, tell us that "no study deserves the name of a sci-
ence if it limits itself to phenomena arising within its national
boundaries." 2 Indeed, during our conference Justice Cruz-Castro
of Costa Rica reminded us that in a small country with no army
like Costa Rica, practicing jurists must consider other countries'
views. And yet, I would expect the audience of a conference that
focuses upon the Americas to ask, "why compare European Union
law with the law of the Americas? The connections are not obvi-
ous." One would be justified in raising that question. Let me try
to answer. The first answer is that our first conference in this se-
ries was entitled "Federalism in the Americas . . . and Beyond,"
3
Professor Peter Tettinger of Duquesne's partner university, the
University of Cologne, joined us and offered comparisons with
Germany and the European Union. That pattern was kept in
place for the present conference.
But beyond that institutional-historical reason, there are other
more substantive and practical reasons as well. Europe certainly
qualifies as being geographically beyond the Americas, but more
importantly, the type of judicial review practiced by the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") is conceptually beyond the types of judi-
cial review practiced in the Americas. In the Americas, our sys-
tems of judicial review may position one branch of government
over another branch of the same national government, as Profes-
sor Garro described for Argentina, and as Professors Gormley and
Antkowiak described for the United States, or may position a
2. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
3. The papers from "Federalism in the Americas ... and Beyond" are published in 43
DUQ. L. REV. 517-653 (2005) and 44 DUQ. L. REV. 3-207 (2005).
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court to review a state or provincial government's legislation
within a federation, as Professor Gamas Torruco described for
Mexico. The judicial review practiced by the European Court of
Justice, on the other hand, positions The European Court of Jus-
tice to review the legislative and judicial acts of independent sov-
ereign states. The unique nature of the European Union is that of
a treaty union of independent sovereign states, each of which has
volunteered to share some of its sovereignty with the Union, while
not allowing the Union itself to become a state, but whose Union's
law explicitly has been characterized by the European Court of
Justice as independent of 4 and superior to that of the member
states by the European Court of Justice. 5 Consequently, judicial
reviews conducted by the European Court of Justice are in many
ways beyond more traditional notions of judicial review. But as
Professor Brand reminded us, before we can get beyond the hori-
zon that is so immediate, we must be conscious of our own position
such that we can have a perspective from which to look beyond. It
is a geographic position, a conceptual position, and as I hope to
demonstrate, a temporal position.
"JUDICIAL REVIEW" AND "THE AMERICAS"
Regarding judicial review in the United States, Judge Smith,
Professor Gormley and Professor Antkowiak have all noted that
the term "judicial review" is not found in the Constitution of the
United States of America.
That so many doubts and challenges are raised is due pre-
eminently to the failure of the American Founding Fathers to
spell it out in the Constitution in so many words. Yet the re-
cords of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787
indicate that the idea or principle of judicial review was a
matter of distinct concern to the framers who, after all, had
little use for unrestrained popular majoritarian government;
that judicial review was indeed known to the colonists be-
cause the British Privy Council had established it over acts
passed by colonial legislatures; that at least eight of the rati-
fying state conventions had expressly discussed and accepted
the judicial power to pronounce legislative acts void; and that
4. Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming)
v. Nederlandse Administratie der Balastingen, 1971 E.C.R. 1.
5. Case 6/64, Costa (Flaminio) v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141.
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prior to 1789 some eight instances of state court judicial re-
view against state legislatures had taken place.... Research
by constitutional historians such as Charles A. Beard, Ed-
ward S. Corwin, and Alpheus T. Mason indicates that be-
tween 25 and 32 of the 40 delegates at Philadelphia generally
favored the adoption of judicial review.
6
The relevance of the term "Americas" in our conference title does
not represent the limited view of the Americas from within the
Americas, but also includes influences on the Americas from be-
yond, and influences from the Americas to the beyond. To this
end, one may note that the Philadelphia Convention itself influ-
enced the recent European Convention to draft the Treaty to Es-
tablish a Constitution for Europe. 7 The President of the Conven-
tion, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, carried a
copy of James Madison's biography with him, and on more than
one occasion the media as well as d'Estaing referred to himself as
'Madison," and to the Convention as "Philadelphia."8  In fact, the
papers from the Convention were published as a series, titled "The
European Convention Papers," as a conscious allusion to the pub-
lication in the New York press in 1787 and 1788 of the Federalist
Papers by James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. 9
Let me just make a few points regarding the unique legal institu-
tions and political structure of the European Union before discuss-
ing the specifics of one of its institutions, the European Court of
Justice, where we find instances of judicial review practices.
It was not a coincidence that immediately after the war, while
speaking at the University of Ziirich on December 19, 1946, and
proposing that the countries of Europe needed to work together to
prevent another European war, that Winston Churchill called the
new union a "United States of Europe." By 1952, Germany,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had all
come together in Paris and signed the first Community Treaty
which included a European Court of Justice - The European Coal
and Steel Convention. Just two years later, those same six coun-
6. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 6-7 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1977) (citations omitted).
7. For comment on this cumbersome title of "Treaty to Establish a Constitution for
Europe," see Kirk W. Junker, Constitution, 38 FUTURES 224 (2006).
8. d'Estaing continues to refer to Madison in his speeches on the conference and its
project. See Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Speech at the London School of Economics: The
Political Future of Europe (Feb. 28, 2006).
9. The European Convention Papers, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003.
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tries formed two more treaty communities in Rome, both of which
included the European Court of Justice as one of its institutions.
These two additional constitutive treaties were the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty and the Euratom Community Treaty.
Although the general jurisdictional competence of the European
Communities has always been held by the European Court of Jus-
tice, the unique and intriguing nature of the mixtures and divi-
sions of competencies and loyalties of the other communities' insti-
tutions must be addressed in order to understand the context of
the European Court of Justice. The division of powers among the
institutions of the European Communities - now the European
Union 10 - lies not along the lines of Montesquieu's tripartite gov-
ernment, nor along the lines of a parliamentary or a presidential
system.
The division of loyalties legally required of the members of the
institutions of the European Union is instead divided in three
ways: (1) to the citizens of Europe, (2) to the governments of the
respective member states and (3) to the European Union on the
whole. Thus the "checks and balances" that one might imagine
existing among various institutions of government work in three
dimensions in the European Union. One participates in the Euro-
pean Union through one of three different loyalties that are di-
vided among legal institutions with multiple and divided functions
of governance. For example, the legislative function is distributed
among the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, with
none of the three institutions having the complete and independ-
ent ability to pass any form of legislation. In most instances, the
Commission proposes legislation, but the Council must ratify it.
In more recent years, due largely to calls for more representative
government, the Parliament had been given some abilities either
to propose or ratify legislation of some types (but still is incapable
of enacting legislation on its own). Likewise, the executive func-
tion, although more centralized in the one institution of the Coun-
cil than the legislative function, also remains diffused between the
Commission and Council.
Moreover, the Council (of Ministers) is comprised of ministers
holding various cabinet positions in their home states, and who
thus are legally bound and responsible to their home states. Par-
liament, on the other hand, is elected by all European citizens
10. The Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht in 1993, was the first treaty
to begin using the term "European Union" to refer to all of the communities as one entity.
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through the European parties (not through domestic parties); the
legal duties and responsibilities of the Parliamentarians are thus
duties and responsibilities to persons as citizens of Europe (not as
citizens of their respective states), as represented through their
European political parties.
And finally, although the Commissioners are appointed by their
home states' executives, their duty is to the public legal entity that
is the European Union, not to a respective home state. Conse-
quently, when a piece of legislation is proposed by the Commis-
sion, it is proposed by persons charged with a duty to the Euro-
pean Union, but that legislation can only be ratified by the Coun-
cillors who remain representatives of the interests of their several
states, or the Parliamentarians, who are representatives of the
European people.
The judicial function is the most centralized governmental func-
tion within the European Union, with general jurisdiction having
been originally vested in the European Court of Justice alone, and
the Court of Auditors having only limited subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. In 1998, under the Single European Union Act," the Court
of First Instance was added to alleviate some of the workload of
the European Court of Justice. The two-tiered system that the
Court of First Instance and European Court of Justice now enjoy,
could well be said to make the structure of the judiciary the most
traditional structure of the European Union's institutions. Some
commentators have noted that the European Court of Justice and
the Court of First Instance, like most courts in civil law systems,
differ from the Anglo-American common law courts in three main
ways: (1) they emphasize written, rather than oral procedures, (2)
they, and not the parties, direct the development of the evidence,
and (3) there is an absence of dissenting opinions.12
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMUNITY ACTION
While there may arguably be other possible judicial reviews of
acts of Community institutions, the main provisions for review are
found in Articles 230, 232, 235, 241 and 288 of the unified consti-
tutive legislation of the European Community Treaty ("ECT" or
"Treaty"). Article 230 of the Treaty empowers the European Court
11. Single European Act (1986), http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/selected/livre509.html.
12. RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 122 (5th ed. 2005).
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of Justice and the Court of First Instance to review the legality of
binding institutional acts. Article 230 provides:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, of acts of
the Council, of the Commission and of the ECB [European
Central Bank], other than recommendations and opinions,
and of acts of the European Parliament intended to produce
legal effects vis-A-vis third parties. 
13
Article 249 provides a list of those acts considered to be binding,
including directives, regulations and decisions. Perhaps as impor-
tant as this mechanical application of the Treaty to the acts, is the
fact that the European Court of Justice has continually considered
the "nature and effect" of an act and not simply its form. While
one might well anticipate that the usual legislative and executive
acts of the institutions would be subject to review, the European
Court of Justice has interpreted the Treaty's term "acts" to include
direct "legal effects," similar to the concept explained by Justice
Richard for Canadian law, and to institutional acts which have
binding effects. Although the Community Courts do not practice
the common law notion of stare decisis, several of their decisions
do stand as seminal interpretations of Community law, including
the notion of binding effect. In the 1971 case known as the Euro-
pean Road Transport Agreement (or "ERTA") decision, 14 the Euro-
pean Court of Justice found that although the act in question was
only a resolution, it had sufficiently binding legal effects on rela-
tions among Community institutions, and therefore, the Court
concluded that it was reviewable.
The European Court of Justice further held that acts that pro-
duced legal effects over and against third parties were also re-
viewable, even though such acts were not included in the Article
230 list of acts. 15 Of course, review by the Community courts of
the acts of other institutions is not always welcome by the other
institutions. More than once, for example, the Commission has
sought to stop the review of what it characterized as "soft law"
acts. 16 Appropriate to this line of resistance, some commentators
have noted an increase in characterizing Community acts as "soft
13. European Community Treaty art. 230 (1957, as amended).
14. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263.
15. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
16. Case C-325/91, France v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3283.
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law," and have therefore concluded that member states ought to
welcome the vigilant approach taken by the European Court of
Justice in taking jurisdiction over even such acts and reviewing
them for legality, as a policy that protects the individual against
the institutions. 17
Article 232 provides, in part: "Should the European Parliament,
the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail
to act, the Member States and the other institution of the Com-
munity may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the
infringement established."18 Article 235 provides: "The Court of
Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensa-
tion for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article
288."19
And finally, adding to the list of reviewable acts, Article 241 in-
cludes the ability of an individual to challenge a regulation
adopted by the institutions jointly or singly. Article 241 provides:
Notwithstanding the expiry of the period laid down in the
fifth paragraph of Article 230, any party may, in proceedings
in which a regulation adopted jointly by the European Par-
liament and the Council, or a regulation of the Council, of the
Commission, or of the ECB is at issue, plead the grounds
specified in the second paragraph of Article 230 in order to in-
voke before the Court of Justice the inapplicability of that
regulation. 20
Beyond the Treaty's list of acts by EU institutions that are re-
viewable, one finds that administrative acts taken by the Commis-
sion have also been held by the Court to be reviewable. 21 But it
would be wrong to read the Treaty and the interpretations of the
European Court of Justice as all-inclusive and ever-expanding.
Not all acts of Community institutions are reviewable. For in-
stance, when the member states act, even if convened as the
17. MARGOT HORSPOOL, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 240 (Reed Elsevier, 3d ed. 2003).
18. European Community Treaty art. 232.
19. Id. art. 235.
20. Id. art. 241.
21. See Case 8-11/66, SA Cimenteries CBR Cementbedrijven NV v. Comm'n, 1967
E.C.R. 75; Case T-3/93, Air France v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-121; and Case 60/81, IBM v.
Comm'n, 1981 E.C.R. 2639; Juirgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative
Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2004).
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Council, the European Court of Justice consistently has found the
actions not to be reviewable.
22
While the Court's determinations of what actions are reviewable
generally have been accepted by the member states, the issue of
who has standing to apply for review of those acts has been a far
more controversial issue. Potential litigants are characterized as
either "privileged," "semi-privileged," or "non-privileged," when it
comes to ascertaining whether the potential litigant has standing.
The European Court of Justice has interpreted Article 230 of the
Treaty to confer a privileged status to certain parties - the Com-
mission, the Council and the member states themselves - be-
cause they are considered to have a direct interest in any acts un-
der review and, therefore, automatically have standing. By com-
parison, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank
and the Court of Auditors are all semi-privileged parties that may
take action only "for the purpose of protecting their preroga-
tives."23 Other applicants for review may need to demonstrate a
particular interest in an act in order to have standing before the
Community courts for review of the act. Natural and legal per-
sons, as non-privileged parties, may bring actions before the Court
of First Instance, but the record will show that they have a diffi-
cult time establishing the requisite interest. Article 230(4) re-
quires of these natural or legal persons that one of three things
has occurred: (1) a decision was addressed to the party; (2) a deci-
sion was addressed to another person which is of direct and indi-
vidual concern to the party; or (3) a decision was made in the form
of a regulation which is of direct and individual concern to the
party. 24
Although judicial review of community action usually concerns
Community Court review of the legality of the Community Institu-
tion's acts discussed above, before concluding this brief review, it
would also be worth considering what are known as "referrals"
under Article 234. Therein it is provided that member state
courts, when presented with actions arising under, or claiming
relief through, Community law, may send the issue to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice for advice on interpreting the issue of Com-
munity law. Specifically, Article 234 provides:
22. Case C-181/91 and C-248/91, European Parliament v. Council and Comm'n, 1993
E.C.R. 1-3685.
23. European Community Treaty art. 230(3).
24. Id. art. 230(4).
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The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give prelimi-
nary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions
of the Community and of the ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by
an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court of tribunal of
a Member State, that court of tribunal may, if it considers
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable to it to
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon. 25
Thus, while Article 234 does not provide the European Court of
Justice with compulsory jurisdiction to review any additional acts
of European institutions, it clearly functions to give the Court the
power to "review" cases in member state courts before a decision
has been taken, and to advise those courts on how the cases
should be decided in accordance with established European law.
Left unsaid is the suggestion that if a member state court decides
not to accept the recommendation of the European Court of Jus-
tice, then it may well find its decision overturned during a later
review upon formal appeal.
Looking ahead, it seems that although the Treaty Establishing
a Constitution for Europe 26 has been stalled by the failure of
France and the Netherlands to ratify, the Treaty in some form
may well eventually become law. If it were to become law in its
current form, judicial review in the European Union would not
likely change. The Conference of the Representatives of the Gov-
ernments of the Member States, convened in Brussels on Septem-
ber 30, 2003, to adopt the Treaty establishing. a Constitution for
Europe, also adopted a series of Protocols, Annexes and Declara-
tions concerning the Treaty. One of those is entitled "Declaration
concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. ' 27 Therein, the Conference explains the relationship of
the Constitutional Treaty to the Charter and to the notion of judi-
25. Id. art. 234.




cial review, stating: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an
effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the condi-
tions laid down in this Article." 28 In reference to Article 11-107,
the "Declaration concerning the explanations relating to the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights" states:
The Charter of Fundamental Rights has not been intended to
change the system of judicial review laid down by the Trea-
ties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility for di-
rect actions before the Court of Justice. The European Con-
vention has considered the Union's system of judicial review
including the rules of admissibility and confirmed them. 29
WHY Do MEMBER STATES AND CITIZENS ACCEPT THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE'S REVIEW?
To ask why European Union member states and citizens have
accepted judicial review invites comparison with the Americas,
and opens the question more broadly to ask why anyone accepts
judicial review? When American primary and secondary school
students are taught the principles of American government, a
standard point of instruction is to describe how a bill becomes a
law. The issue is taught and tested as a simple, pragmatic ques-
tion and answer process. It is anticipated by teachers and stu-
dents alike that the positive statement of law found in the Consti-
tution and law-making statutes will answer the question. It does
not. No matter how lifeless the detached study of law may seem,
once it is reinserted in the soil of living society, it comes back to
life. Witnesses and litigating parties bring law to life and keep it
alive. Through their attitude toward the law, it is they who make
judicial decisions binding. To this end, Professor Antkowiak in-
sisted that for a judiciary to enable a society to achieve Montes-
quieu's idea of virtue, it must be responsive to the society. Justice
Cruz-Castro pointed out that in order to legitimize judicial review,
judges must acknowledge that their work is connected with the
political system.
28. Id.
29. European Communities, Declaration Concerning the Explanations Relating to the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 458 (Office




This consideration of judicial review in the relatively new judi-
cial system of the European Union serves to highlight this theme
as it precipitated from this conference. That theme is to ask why
any court, state's attorney, private attorney or litigant would ac-
cept the review of the efforts of their trial by another court? In
other words, rather than asking how judicial review in any of the
systems of the Americas or Europe works, one must ask why does
judicial review work? The legal mechanic might quickly respond
with something about contempt powers over litigants and lawyers
who do not obey judicial orders, or even mention criminal punish-
ments for judges unwilling to accept the review of their judicial
superiors. And yes, there are sheriffs and police to enforce these
rules. But the fear of enforcement alone is no more persuasive an
argument for the peaceful following of judicial review than it is for
the peaceful following of criminal prohibitions on murder, rape or
robbery.
My own study of delay in United States' courts from some years
ago has revealed that regardless of the measures taken by courts
to speed the process along, it is the local legal culture of practicing
lawyers that delays pre-trial, trial, post-trial and appellate proc-
esses. 30 Practicing lawyers accept the legal time limits imposed,
using the time prior to the expiration of those limits as their tool
to obtain both flexibility in negotiations and the ability to take on
more cases. Thus, the examples of judicial review and delay in the
courts exemplify the fact that the inner workings of a legal system
among legal practitioners are subject to the same need of accep-
tance by those affected from the ground upwards, just as the
norms of the criminal or civil law systems themselves need to be
accepted as legitimate from the ground upwards in order to be ef-
fective. This leaves open new, ripe comparative law territory to be
explored in the legitimacy of judicial review, as it is accepted in
various systems by those practicing under it - judges, lawyers
and litigants.
While some Euroskeptics had in the past, rather predictably,
concluded things such as "the ECJ does not possess a surplus of
legitimacy,"31 it is currently undeniable that the ECJ and Court of
First Instance are able to exercise the power of judicial review ex-
plicitly granted to them in the Treaty, and that they do so in an
30. Kirk W. Junker, Delay in the Courts: A Closer Look (1980) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author).
31. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Changes in the Legitimacy of the European
Court of Justice: A Post Maastricht Analysis, 28 BRIT. J. OF POL. Sci. 63, 63 (1998).
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expansive fashion. 32 Thus the question to consider is not whether
the ECJ has judicial review power, nor whether it has legitimacy,
but rather, why do member states accept the ECJ's review? An
unplanned theme has precipitated from this conference, articu-
lated by the participants in different ways. It begins with a
statement by Professor Barker in his welcome letter in the pro-
gram. He notes that judicial review is "an integral part of the law
and politics of the United States," a point that was then empha-
sized in the conference's opening by Dean Donald J. Guter.
The European -Court of Justice stated, in what has become a
landmark decision, Costa v. ENEL:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
Treaty has created its own legal system which ... became an
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and
which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Commu-
nity of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of repre-
sentation on the international plane, and, more particularly,
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the
Member States have limited their sovereign rights ...and
have thus created a body of law which binds both their na-
tionals and themselves. 33
This bootstrapping statement is no less important to the inde-
pendence and capacity of the European Court of Justice than the
United States Supreme Court's own bootstrapping position of judi-
cial review announced in the landmark decision of Marbury v.
Madison.34 Judge Brooks Smith demonstrated that, historically, it
has not been the mechanics and rules of judicial review that se-
cured it firmly in place in the United States, but rather it is the
legal culture's embrace that puts it there and keeps it there.
Later, in his historical presentation of judicial review in Mexico,
Professor Gamas-Torruco illustrated very well the interplay of
law, politics and even the armed forces.
Judicial review in the European legal system also acts politi-
cally as a tool of legal integration. Political commentators have
asserted that "the Court of Justice has been the prime mover in
32. HORSPOOL, supra note 17, at 238.
33. Case 6/64, Costa (Flaminio) v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141.
34. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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European legal integration and that national governments have
accepted the court's lead. '
35
According to Geoffrey Garrett, "governments must weigh the
costs of accepting the court's decision against the benefits derived
from having an effective legal system in the EU (in terms of en-
hancing the efficacy of the internal market)," as is exemplified in
the famous Cassis de Dijon36 case. In Cassis de Dijon, the Ger-
man government accepted a European Court of Justice decision
that hurt German trade in the short term, but could have been
calculated to benefit German trade in the long term. 37 Garret con-
tends that the European Court of Justice is also what he terms a
"strategic rational actor," and that the Court understands that the
legal power conferred by the Treaties alone is not sufficient to
force member states to accept Court decisions. 38 Additionally,
Garret notes that neither the direct effect nor supremacy doctrines
are written into any of the constitutive treaties of the European
Union, but instead have been invented and developed by the Court
itself.39 Thus, the Court's power "depends critically on the con-
tinuing acquiescence of national governments."
40
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I return for a moment to the word "beyond." In
the beginning of my remarks, I noted that as used here, I mean
"beyond" in more than a geographic sense. I mean it in the sense
by which we define judicial review. In the Americas, the term
means some form of intra-sovereign review power. In the case of
the European Court of Justice, judicial review means a trans-
sovereign review power. But there is yet a third sense of the word
"beyond" as well. The third sense of the word is a temporal one.
An examination question that I like to use to test my students'
vision begins by pointing out that the organization of legal publics
is fluid and changing. Our study of history demonstrates that
monarchies, for instance, are far less prevalent than they once
were. And while states may seem to have replaced them, history
35. Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT'L
ORG. 171, 171 (1995) (citing Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court:
A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993)).
36. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuir Branntwein: 120/78 [1979] ECR
649, ECJ.
37. Cassis de Dijon, 120/78.
38. Garrett, supra note 35, at 172-73.
39. Id. at 172.
40. Id. at 173.
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warns us that they too will change and perhaps cease to be recog-
nized as the focus of public legal organization and identity.
So what forms of public legal organizations are on the horizon?
The European Union, with its unique sense of shared sovereignty
and trans-sovereign judicial review would seem to be one of them.
Professor Barker, in his opening remarks, used the terms "old
world" and "new world." These are not only appellations for wine,
but for legal systems as well. And yet the old world's legal sys-
tems which have produced the languages that we speak as well as
the legal structures through which we speak at this conference
are, in a most important and fascinating way for public interna-
tional lawyers, the New World again.
During the Convention to draft the Treaty Establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe, the Convention President, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, carried the biography of James Madison with him and
frequently referred to his role as that of Madison. Further, the
African Union has not stated that it wishes to model itself upon
the legal systems of North America, nor has it stated that it
wishes to model itself upon the legal systems of Latin America; it
has stated that it wishes to model itself upon the European Union.
This is particularly meaningful when one considers that the old
Organization of African Unity, a predecessor of the African Union,
had as its main purpose a goal to rid the continent of European
colonizers. In response, the European Union has established in-
stitutional initiatives that include not only economic development,
as in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
program, 41 but support in ideas for government and politics as
well. So as we depart from this conference and have the opportu-
nity to reflect upon all that we have discussed here, let us not for-
get the admonition from Kenneth Burke that the conversation is
unending.
(NEPAD),41. New Partnership for Africa's Development
http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200607/p133030.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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